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PUBLIC SAFETY OR SOCIAL EXCLUSION?
CONSTITUTIONAL CHALLENGES




Modern loitering ordinances that regulate the uses of public
space came into widespread application in the late 1980s and
1990s as local governments incorporated them into broader pub-
lic safety and crime reduction efforts., Broadly speaking, these
loitering ordinances encompass a range of regulations designed
to limit the presence or behavior of certain individuals in certain
public spaces. Typically, these ordinances empower police of-
ficers to order dispersal of the groups engaging in activities pro-
hibited by the ordinance and provide cause to arrest those who
fail to comply.2
This paper explores constitutional challenges to loitering ordi-
nances and related regulations at the federal level with respect
to how the laws have evolved over time and across different so-
cietal circumstances. Though loitering ordinances are largely en-
acted at the municipal level, many successful legal challenges to
them have come through the federal court system. This provides
an interesting insight into the tension between locally based ef-
I Kim Strosnider, Anti-Gang Ordinances After City Of Chicago V Morales:
The Intersection Of Race, Vagueness Doctrine, And Equal Protection In The
Criminal Law, 39 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 101 (2002).
2 Kathryn Hansel, Constitutional Othering: Citizenship and the Insufficiency
of Negative Rights-Based Challenges to Anti-Homeless Systems, 6 Nw. J. L. &
Soc. PoL'Y, 445, 445 (2011).
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forts to promote public safety and the protection of civil
liberties.
CRITICISMS OF LOITERING ORDINANCES
Critics of loitering laws consider them to be new iterations of
historically classist vagrancy laws that, instead of targeting disfa-
vored groups explicitly, focused on behaviors commonly associ-
ated with those groups as a proxy. Historically, their impact has
disproportionately fallen on individuals experiencing homeless-
ness, communities of color and other disfavored individuals such
as sex workers, drug addicts and political dissidents.3
As noted above, the variety of loitering ordinances that have
become increasingly common since the 1980s typically pertain to
activities that occur in public spaces such as sidewalks and street
corners. Many identify specific zones of enforcement within a
municipality, effectively excluding members of targeted groups
from these areas.4 This becomes particularly problematic when
these areas are home to a high concentration of vital services,
such as food assistance, drug treatment centers and public
agencies. 5
Loitering laws rarely require their targets to be engaged in
any sort of independent criminal act. Critics argue that this
opens them up to broad discretion by the enforcing officer and
enables selective enforcement. 6 For example, many early loiter-
ing laws targeted individuals who "lacked visible means of sup-
port" or were enforced against students engaging in sit-in
3 Id.
4 Karen H. Bancroft, Zones of Exclusion: Urban Spatial Policies, Social Jus-
tice, and Social Services, J. Soc. & Soc. WELFARE, 39 (2012).
5 Id.
6 Vanessa Wheeler, Discrimination Lurking on the Books: Examining the
Constitutionality of the Minneapolis Lurking Ordinance, 26 LAW & INEQ. 467
(2008).
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protests.7 Though modern loitering ordinances are more likely
to target activities associated with well-defined crimes (such as
drug trafficking), connecting the act of loitering to criminal in-
tent remains a legal challenge.8
CONSTITUTIONAL CHALLENGES
While loitering ordinances have been challenged under a vari-
ety of different provisions of state constitutions, three doctrines
have been the most common bases for challenges in federal
courts. All three primarily focus on the amount of discretion an
enforcing officer is given under the ordinance, and the potential
for this discretion to be used towards discriminatory ends.
Void-For- Vagueness Doctrine
The void-for-vagueness doctrine is derived from the due pro-
cess clauses of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments. The core
prongs of the doctrine are notice and prohibition of arbitrary
enforcement.9 Under the first prong, ordinances must provide
sufficient notice so that an ordinary person may be able to infer
which activities are and are not permissible. 10 Some argue that
this is the weaker of the two prongs, as many criminal laws are
enforced without offering any notice or specificity of prohibited
behaviors. 1 The second prong of the void-for-vagueness doc-
trine requires the legislation to be sufficiently clear that it would
not lead to arbitrary to discriminatory enforcement.12
Normally, facial challenges to criminal laws must demonstrate
that the statue was unconstitutional as applied to the individual
7 Paul W. Poulos, Chicago's Ban on Gang Loitering: Making Sense of Vague-
ness and Overbreadth in Loitering Laws, 83 CAL. L. REV. 379 (1995).
8 See Wheelersupra note 6.
9 Id. at 473.
1o Id.
1 Poulos, supra note 7, at 390.
12 Wheeler, supra note 6, at 474.
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before the court. However, under the void-for-vagueness doc-
trine, challengers have historically only been required to demon-
strate that the law as written could implicate other individuals
engaging in constitutionally protected activities.13 Nevertheless,
in cases where the court finds the individual's actions to be
clearly within scope of prohibited activities, such challenges are
usually unsuccessful. 14
Overbreadth Doctrine
Though similar to the vagueness doctrine in its emphasis on
legislative scope, the overbreadth doctrine focuses on the impact
that overly vague laws have on constitutionally permissible ac-
tivities, particularly those protected under the First Amend-
ment. Lack of specificity in this area is thought to have a
"chilling effect" on the practice of constitutionally protected ac-
tivities, again lending itself to discriminatory enforcement.15
Courts have historically been more inclined to overturn laws
that impinge on activities protected under the First Amendment
because these are considered vital to the functioning of Ameri-
can society.16
Loitering laws have been particularly susceptible to over-
breadth challenges because of their inherent regulation of the
freedoms of association and assembly.17 Like the vagueness doc-
trine, the overbreadth doctrine allows for a facial challenge
based on the potential for the law applied as written to violate
the First Amendment rights of other individuals. In fact, as a
result of the similarity between the two doctrines, courts are
often not rigorous about distinguishing between the two in their
opinions.18 This has convoluted the legal analysis of many court
13 Poulos, supra note 7, at 393.
14 Id.
15 Id. at 391; see also Wheeler, supra note 6, at 476.
16 Poulos, supra note 7, at 403.
17 Wheeler, supra note 6, at 477.
18 Poulos, supra note 7, at 392.
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decisions, leading some scholars to question whether the two
doctrines can ultimately be considered separately. 19
Equal Protection Challenges
Equal protection challenges are also largely corollary with the
void-for-vagueness doctrine. These challenges are applied to loi-
tering laws that enable arbitrary arrests based on vague descrip-
tions of offending activities. Such regulations are alleged to
facilitate discriminatory enforcement against certain classes of
people, violating the equal protection clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment.20
While there is much evidence that loitering laws have a dispa-
rate impact on the homeless and communities of color, chal-
lenges based on equal protection grounds have largely been
unsuccessful.21 In fact, the equal protection doctrine is notably
weak in criminal law, with relatively few cases litigated on its
basis involving prosecutors rather than law enforcement of-
ficers.22 The primary reason these challenges have been largely
unsuccessful is the incredibly high burden of proof required of
plaintiffs. In the 1976 case Washington v. Davis, the court held
that equal protection challenges must present evidence of dis-
criminatory intent, not merely discriminatory effect.23 This stan-
dard was reaffirmed by the McClesky v. Kemp (1987) decision,
in which the Court determined that evidence of racially dispa-
rate application of the death penalty in the state of Georgia was
insufficient to sustain an equal protection challenge.2 4 Rarely, if
ever, are activates with discriminatory intent so brazen as to
meet this standard.
19 Strosnider, supra note 1, at 117.
20 Wheeler, supra note 6, at 481.
21 Hansel, supra note 2, at 453.
22 Strosnider, supra note 1, at 113.
23 Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 244-45 (1976).
24 McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279 (1987).
Volume 8, Number I Winter 2_01+
5
Divringi: Public Safety or Social Exclusion? Constitutional Challenges to t
Published by Via Sapientiae, 2016
DePaul Journal for Social Justice 6
The Court's reluctance to accept equal protection challenges
based on disparate impact reflects the concern that such a find-
ing could unleash a Pandora's box of litigation.25 Due to factors
that many consider exogenous to the legal process, most crimi-
nal laws are disproportionately enforced against communities of
color. Allowing an equal protection challenge based on dispa-
rate impact alone, the Court feared, could open up virtually all
of these laws to constitutional challenge. 26
HISTORIC ROOTS: VAGRANCY LAWS &
EARLY LOITERING ORDINANCES
Loitering laws in the United States are often considered to be
derived from old English vagrancy laws. 27 Originated during the
collapse of feudalism, these laws were based on the assumption
that newly unemployed serfs would need to support themselves
through crime, and therefore sought to make the state of idle-
ness and unemployment illegal.2 8 As a result, in addition to
crime prevention, vagrancy laws served an economic rationale
that sought to punish individuals of lower socioeconomic-classes
who refused to participate in the feudal economy. 29 In a similar
vein, during the antebellum period, southern states enacted a
series of vagrancy-type laws to restrict the movement of slaves
and prevent opportunities for organized rebellion.30 In the after-
math of the Emancipation Proclamation, these statutes were re-
fashioned as the "Black Codes," using similar means to prevent
the newly freed from escaping exploitive plantation work. 31
25 Strosnider, supra note 1, at 124.
26 Id. at 125-26.
27 Dorothy E. Roberts, Race, Vagueness, and the Social Meaning of Order-
Maintenance Policing, 89 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 775 (1998-1999).
28 Wheeler, supra note 6, at 469.
29 Poulos, supra note 7.
30 Roberts, supra note 27.
31 Gary Stewart, Black Codes and Broken Windows: The Legacy Of Racial
Hegemony In Anti-Gang Civil Injunctions, 107 YALE L.J. 2249 (1998).
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While many early loitering laws were blatantly incompatible
with the constitutional rights guaranteed to all Americans, the
indigent communities against whom they were enforced were
largely incapable of mustering the legal resources to fight them
in court. 32 However, legal challenges to these laws became more
common in the mid-1960s after the Supreme Court decided in
Gideon v. Wainwright that indigent persons charged with felo-
nies were entitled to legal representation. 33 The following sec-
tion provides an overview of key vagrancy cases tried in federal
courts that set important precedents for the later consideration
of loitering laws.
Goldman v. Knecht (1969)
Illustrating the extent to which early loitering laws were arbi-
trarily enforced, Goldman v. Knetch arose from the arrest of in-
dividuals who were neither loitering nor moving about in public.
The plaintiffs were residing in what District Judge Doyle de-
scribed as a "hippie hangout" when officers entered in a search
for narcotics. 34 Though no narcotics were found, plaintiffs were
charged under the state of Colorado's vagrancy statute, which
defined a vagrant as "a person able to work in an honest and
respectable calling, who is found loitering or strolling about, fre-
quenting public places where liquor is sold, begging, or leading
an idle, immoral, or profligate course of life, or not having any
visible means of support." 35 Plaintiffs were arrested again a few
months later under similar circumstances.
Certainly, it would not require a constitutional scholar or ex-
perienced law enforcement professional to see that interpreta-
tion of this statute invites broad discretion. How would an
officer be able to deem a person "able to work in an honest and
32 Poulos, supra note 7, at 387.
33 Wheeler, supra note 6, at 470.
34 Goldman v. Knecht, 295 F.Supp. 897, 899 (D.Colo. 1969).
35 CoLo. REV. STAT. § 40-8-19 (1963).
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respectable calling," or as having no "visible means of support?"
Accordingly, the District Court for the District of Colorado
found that the law was both overbroad and unconstitutionally
vague. Words such as "loitering" and "strolling" were seen as
open to subjective determination and arbitrary enforcement.3 6
Further, the court noted that the statute "subjects to arrest, im-
prisonment and fine essentially every able-bodied citizen of Col-
orado who happens, at one time or another, to be doing one of
the inherently innocuous acts or things mentioned." 37 Further-
more, the Court raised substantive due process concerns around
criminalizing an individual's status (i.e. as a vagrant) as opposed
to a specific behavior.
Papachristou v. City of Jacksonville (1972)
In their first modern decision on vagrancy laws, the U.S. Su-
preme Court overturned a vagrancy ordinance enacted in the
city of Jacksonville, Florida38 on the basis of unconstitutional
vagueness. At the time the decision was delivered, vagrancy
laws were still common in many states.39 Papachristou was the
36 Goldman, 295 F.Supp. at 901-02.
37 Id. at 904.
38 Jacksonville Ordinance Code § 26-57 provided at the time of these arrests
and convictions as follows: "Rogues and vagabonds, or dissolute persons who
go about begging, common gamblers, persons who use juggling or unlawful
games or plays, common drunkards, common night walkers, thieves, pilferers
or pickpockets, traders in stolen property, lewd, wanton and lascivious per-
sons, keepers of gambling places, common railers and brawlers, persons wan-
dering or strolling around from place to place without any lawful purpose or
object, habitual loafers, disorderly persons, persons neglecting all lawful busi-
ness and habitually spending their time by frequenting houses of ill fame,
gaming houses, or places where alcoholic beverages are sold or served, per-
sons able to work but habitually living upon the earnings of their wives or
minor children shall be deemed vagrants and, upon conviction in the Munici-
pal Court shall be punished as provided for Class D offenses."
39 Hansel, supra note 2, at 449.
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first case to outline the prongs of the vagueness doctrine as it
applies to loitering-statues.40
The five consolidated cases included the Papachristou deci-
sion illustrate the vast breadth and arbitrariness of these early
laws. In the first case, a car full of individuals of different racial
backgrounds were ostensibly arrested for "prowling by auto" af-
ter stopping near a used-car lot that had previously been broken
into, despite there being no evidence of a break-in on the night
of their arrest. In another, two young African American men
were arrested for "loitering" while waiting for a friend to lend
them a car so they could apply for a job. In perhaps the most
egregious abuse of the ordinance's scope, one young man was
arrested for "loitering" in a driveway after being stopped by an
officer and asked to step out of his vehicle.41
Accordingly, the court found that the ordinance was overly
vague, effectively giving police officers the ability to arbitrarily
punish members of socially disfavored groups. Indeed, instead
of condemning loitering as a suspicious or unsavory practice,
Justice Douglas in his majority opinion extolled the value of ac-
tivities that the Jacksonville ordinance prohibited, stating:
"The difficulty is that these activities are histori-
cally part of the amenities of life as we have
known them. They are not mentioned in the Con-
stitution or in the Bill of Rights. These unwritten
amenities have been in part responsible for giving
our people the feeling of independence and self-
confidence, the feeling of creativity. These ameni-
ties have dignified the right of dissent and have
honored the right to be nonconformists and the
right to defy submissiveness. They have en-
couraged lives of high spirits rather than hushed,
suffocating silence. They are embedded in Walt
Volume 8, Number I
40 Id. at 448-49.
41 Papachristou v. Jacksonville, 405 U.S. 156, 159-60 (1972).
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Whitman's writings, especially in his "Song of the
Open Road." They are reflected, too, in the spirit
of Vachel Lindsay's "I Want to Go Wandering,"
and by Henry D. Thoreau." 42
Justice Douglas' emphasis on the virtues of aimless wandering
has subsequently led some to suggest the basis for a due process
"right to loiter." 43
Kolender v. Lawson (1983)
Kolender v. Lawson represents the first Supreme Court ruling
on what are considered modern loitering laws. This case cen-
tered on a California criminal statute that required persons loi-
tering or wandering on public streets to provide "credible and
reliable" identification when stopped by a police officer who has
reasonable suspicion of criminal activity. 44 Lawson, who had
been detained and arrested on these grounds on multiple occa-
sions, sought to enjoin the enforcement of the statute.
In writing the majority opinion, Justice 0' Connor concluded
that the statute "as it has been construed is unconstitutionally
vague within the meaning of the Due Process Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment by failing to clarify what is contem-
plated by the requirement that a suspect provide 'credible and
reliable' identification."' 45 Essentially, the vagueness of the iden-
tification requirement leaves the determination of whether or
not a piece of identification is acceptable to the discretion of the
enforcing officer. In his concurring opinion, Justice Brennan
took this argument a step further, stating that the failure to pro-
duce any form of identification alone should not be grounds for
criminal prosecution.46
42 Id. at 162.
43 Strosnider, supra note 1, at 119.
44 CAL. PENAL CODE § 647(e) (Deering 1970).
45 Kolender v. Lawson, 461 U.S. 352, 353 (1983).
46 Id. at 362.
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MORALES: DUE PROCESS AND EQUAL PROTECTION
The most prominent ruling on modern loitering laws occurred
in 1999, when the Supreme Court heard the Morales v. City of
Chicago case. This case pertained to the enforcement of the
newly passed Gang Congregation Ordinance, which was ostensi-
bly enacted in response to community concerns around rising
drug-related gang violence. 47 The ordinance allowed police to
order groups of two or more people to disperse if they were
loitering in a public place with "no apparent purpose" or if the
police believed that at least one individual was a member of a
gang.48 Failure to disperse could result in arrest. In support of
the law's passage, the City Council found that gang activities
often involved the establishment of control over specific areas
for the purpose of monopolizing local drug trafficking. 49 To the
extent that such behavior leads to inter-gang conflict and the
intimidation of passersby, an ordinance targeting suspicious loi-
tering was argued to be an appropriate response.
However, not everyone was convinced of the ordinance's
merits. Critics of the law alleged from the beginning that the
ordinance was designed by business owners to target youth from
communities of color who socially utilize street corners and pub-
lic spaces.50 They argued that because enforcement is based on
the officer's assessment of an individual's criminal proclivities,
the ordinance lent itself to arbitrary and discriminatory enforce-
ment. While racialized policing does little to improve a commu-
nity's safety, they argued, it does guarantee that traditional
targets of discriminatory practices will continue to be subject to
extensive police monitoring.51 Like many loitering laws, the
47 City of Chicago v. Morales, 527 U.S. 41 (1999).
48 CHICAGO, ILL. MUNICIPAL CODE §8-4-015(c)(5) (1992).
49 Poulos, supra note 7, at 384.
50 Strosnider, supra note 1, at 121.
51 J. E. Packebusch, Gang Loitering Ordinances Post-Morales: Has Vague-
ness Been Remedied? Somerville, Massachusetts Says Yes, 32 N.E. J. ON
CRIM. & CiV. CON. 161, 181 (2006).
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Gang Congregation Ordinance was quickly met with criticisms
that the fuzzy definition of "loiter" failed to adequately specify
prohibited behaviors.52
In evaluating the ordinance against due process claims, the
Supreme Court used the two-pronged vagueness test to assess if:
1) a person of reasonable intelligence would be able to deter-
mine which activities were and were not lawful, and 2) the of-
fending behaviors would be defined at a level of specificity that
would not facilitate arbitrary or discriminatory enforcement. 53
The majority failed to agree on whether or not the ordinance
provided sufficient notice to satisfy the first prong, basing the
core of its decision on the potential for arbitrary or discrimina-
tory enforcement. It appears that the ordinance's critical flaw
was in its definition of loitering- "to remain in any one place
with no apparent purpose," 54- which lacked a mens rea require-
ment to distinguish between innocent loiterers and individuals
intending to engage in gang-related activities. Further, the ordi-
nance made no mention of how to treat individuals whose loiter-
ing had a clear criminal intent. In the majority opinion, Justice
Stevens found this to be both over and under inclusive:
Ironically, the definition of loitering in the Chi-
cago ordinance not only extends its scope to en-
compass harmless conduct, but also has the
perverse consequence of excluding from its cover-
age much of the intimidating conduct that moti-
vated its enactment. As the city council's findings
demonstrate, the most harmful gang loitering is
motivated either by an apparent purpose to publi-
cize the gang's dominance of certain territory,
thereby intimidating nonmembers, or by an
equally apparent purpose to conceal ongoing com-
merce in illegal drugs. As the Illinois Supreme
Volume 8, Number I
52 Id. at 164.
53 Morales, supra note 47, at 90.
54 CHICAGO, ILL. MUNICIPAL CODE §8-4-015(c)(5) (1992).
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Court has not placed any limiting construction on
the language in the ordinance, we must assume
that the ordinance means what it says and that it
has no application to loiterers whose purpose is
apparent.55
The Court's emphasis on the arbitrary enforcement prong in the
Morales decision was a departure from previous jurisprudence
that had primarily focused on the provision of adequate "no-
tice". Though Kolender v. Lawson (1983) had also largely cen-
tered on the arbitrary enforcement prong, the lack of discussion
of the notice requirement was broadly interpreted as suggesting
the two criteria were conjoined. 56 Some have suggested that this
decision reflects the Court's desire to entertain a facial challenge
to the ordinance, as it is more difficult to establish standing
under the notice prong in cases where the defendant may have
actually engaged in the prohibited conduct.57
Other interpretations of the decision assert that by focusing
on the arbitrary enforcement prong, the Court effectively estab-
lished an equal protection argument that enables a judicial
check on the legislative ability to pass ordinances that have a
disparate impact on people of color.58 Doing so through the
vagueness doctrine, as opposed to the Fourteenth Amendment,
allowed the court to avoid political scrutiny for expanding the
rights covered by substantive due process.59
In the aftermath of the Morales decision, the City of Chicago
scrambled to reinstate an ordinance that complied with the stan-
dards outlined in the Justices' opinions. Drawing most directly
from Justice 0' Connor's opinion, the new ordinance narrowed
the geographic scope of the ordinance to "known drug corners"
or "hotspots" and eliminated the provision allowing the arrest of
55 Morales, supra note 47, at 63.
56 Stronsinder, supra, note 1 at 115.
57 Id. at 118; Packebusch, supra note 51, at 166.
58 Id.
59 Strosnider, supra note 1, at 116-27.
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non-gang members.60 The new ordinance further clarified loiter-
ing to cover behavior that "would warrant a reasonable person
to believe that the purpose or effect of that behavior is to enable
a criminal street gang" to control a given area.61 Notably, a mens
rea requirement still appears to be absent from the new
ordinance.
POST-MORALES VARIATIONS ON LOITERING ORDINANCES
Following Chicago's lead, a number of large municipalities
across the country began incorporating anti-loitering compo-
nents into their public safety initiatives.62 Where federal courts
have found laws targeting vagrancy and mere loitering unconsti-
tutional, municipalities have responded by further tailoring their
ordinances towards specific disfavored behaviors. This height-
ened level of specificity has allowed a number of this new gener-
ation of loitering ordinances to survive court scrutiny.63 This
section provides an overview of the major federal court cases
that have addressed loitering ordinances since the Morales
decision.
Justin v. City of Los Angeles (2000)
Los Angeles was among the major cities that began utilizing
anti-loitering provisions in its crime-fighting efforts in the late
1990s. Specifically, a section of the Los Angeles Municipal Code
prohibited individuals from standing in or upon any public way
"in such a manner as to annoy or molest any pedestrian thereon
or so as to obstruct or unreasonably interfere with the free pas-
sage of pedestrians." 64
60 Packebusch, supra note 51, at 167.
61 CHICAGO, ILL. MUNICIPAL CODE § 8-4-015(d)(1) (2000).
62 See Packebusch, supra note 51.
63 Hansel, supra note 2, at 449.
64 Los ANGELES, CAL. MUNICIPAL CODE § 41.18(a) (1995).
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In December of 2000, a group of homeless individuals sought
a Temporary Restraining Order to enjoin the enforcement of
this provision, claiming it had resulted in a "widespread cam-
paign of harassment and intimidation directed at" the homeless
population. 65 This harassment was purported to consist of unrea-
sonably stopping homeless individuals and demanding that they
produce identification, ordering homeless individuals to move
from sidewalks, searching and seizing the property of homeless
individuals without probable cause and threatening homeless in-
dividuals with arrest. Plaintiffs went on to claim that the alleged
harassment limits their ability to access critical services such as
food, counseling and emergency shelter, which are concentrated
in the downtown core where the ordinance is most intensively
enforced. Furthermore, they expected enforcement of the ordi-
nance to intensify during the fast-approaching holiday season.66
The Plaintiffs' claims against the City consisted of three parts:
1) the City had violated their constitutionally protected right to
loiter without police interference, 2) unwarranted requests to
produce identification violated their Fourth Amendment rights
and 3) searches, seizures and, in some cases, destruction of per-
sonal property belonging to homeless individuals had further vi-
olated their Fourth Amendment rights.67
With respect to the plaintiff's first claim, the Court cited the
Morales decision as providing precedence for a constitutionally
protected right to loiter.68 While the Court found merit in their
claim that enforcement activities had violated this right, they de-
nied a facial challenge to the code itself. The facial challenge
had been based on the argument that the ordinance - particu-
larly the language "in a manner as to annoy or molest" 69- was
65 Justin v. City of Los Angeles, No. CV-00-12352 LGB, 2000 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 17881, 2000 WL 1808426 (C.D. Cal. Dec. 5, 2000).
66 Id. at 1.
67 Id.
68 Id. at 11-12.
69 Los ANGELES, CAL. MUNICIPAL CODE § 41.18(a) (1995).
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unconstitutionally vague. However, the court found that the
plaintiffs failed to produce evidence that they or anyone else
had been specifically cited under this law, and were therefore
unable to determine whether it had been arbitrarily applied. The
court found merit in the plaintiff's second two claims and
granted the temporary restraining order, being careful to note
the specific actions that were enjoined - among them, issuing
citations to the homeless for loitering - though not the enforce-
ment of the ordinance itself.70
NAACP Anne Arundel County Branch v.
City of Annapolis (2001)
One variant of the loitering statue that has come to wide-
spread use is the Drug-Free Zone. 71 Though a variety of differ-
ent structures have been implemented, ordinances enabling
their use generally outline some sort of criteria for designating a
certain area as a Drug-Free Zone and impose stricter regula-
tions on activities within that area. The stated goal of these regu-
lations is to curtail loitering for the purposes of buying or selling
drugs.72
In 1999, the City Council of Annapolis, Maryland enacted an
ordinance with provisions to establish a Drug-Free Zone. Inside
this zone, a police officer has the ability to order the dispersal of
any individual "behaving in a manner indicating that the person
is remaining at or in a public place.. . for the purpose of engag-
ing in drug-related activity," as well as known drug offenders.73
Before the ordinance even went into effect, the NAACP Anne
Arundel County Branch challenged its constitutionality in Fed-
eral Court, alleging that the new law was both vague and
overbroad.
70 Justin, 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 17881, at 38.
71 Bancroft, supra note 4, at 73.
72 Id. at 64.
73 ANNAPOLIS, MD. MUNICIPAL CODE § 11.12.067 (2004).
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The debate around whether or not the NAACP had standing
to introduce the case constitutes some of the most direct discus-
sion of the racialized nature of anti-loitering laws before a fed-
eral court. In arguing that the challenge was "germane to the
organization's purpose," the NAACP noted that loitering laws
have historically been disproportionately enforced against Afri-
can Americans. 74 They went on to cite that at the time of the
lawsuit all four of the approved Drug-Free Zones were in
predominantly African American neighborhoods, indicating the
potential for continued discriminatory enforcement. 75 The Court
found these arguments sufficiently compelling to conclude that
the ordinance may disproportionately impact Annapolis' Afri-
can American community and granted NAACP standing. 76
The United States District Court of Maryland's subsequent
discussion as to whether or not the ordinance included a mens
rea requirement is demonstrative of the complexities of drafting
an anti-loitering ordinance that withstands constitutional chal-
lenges. Generally, the court notes, loitering ordinances without
mens rea requirements are found to be unconstitutionally
vague.77 Though the City asserted that the ordinance must be
read as having a mens rea requirement, the plain language of the
ordinance only requires "behaving in a manner indicating" 78 in-
tent to engage in drug-related activity. Furthermore, the court
cited evidence that the ordinance was deliberately drafted with-
out this crucial mens rea requirement because, ironically, its au-
thors believed that such a requirement was not measurable or
objective, and therefore vulnerable to legal scrutiny. 79
With respect to the NAACP's vagueness claim, the Court
found that the Annapolis ordinance failed both the notice and
74 NAACP Anne Arundel County Branch v. City of Annapolis, 133
F.Supp.2d 795, 802 (D.Md. 2001).
75 Id at 807.
76 Id at 803.
77 Id at 807.
78 ANNAPOLIS, MD. MUNICIPAL CODE § 11.12.067 (2004).
79 NAACP, 133 F.Supp.2d at 805.
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arbitrary enforcement tests. Given that the ordinance as written
lacked a mens rea requirement, the average person was left to
discern whether or not their activities were prohibited under the
ordinance. In the eyes of the court, this did not constitute suffi-
cient notice. Furthermore, a number of prohibited activities
named in the ordinance, including "hand signals associated with
drug related activity" and "patterns of conduct normally associ-
ated... with the illegal distribution, purchase or possession of
drugs,"80 lack definition, leaving the enforcing officer with sub-
stantial discretion. The court determined that this opened the
door for discriminatory enforcement.8'
Similarly, the court sided with the defendants on the issue of
overbreadthness, finding that the risk of constitutionally pro-
tected activities falling under the scope of the ordinance out-
weighed the potential benefit to the public. One NAACP
member testified that his voter registration activities could fall
under the ordinance's prohibition of distributing small items. By
contrast, the city could not produce substantial evidence that the
ordinance contributed to the goals of public safety. Rather, it
was brought to the court's attention that the ordinance had been
passed by the City Council against the recommendation of Pub-
lic Safety Committee, who felt the ordinance was unnecessary.8 2
Betancourt v. Guliani (2001)
This case arose from the 1997 arrest of a homeless man, Au-
gustine Betancourt, in New York City under the subsection of a
loitering ordinance that prohibited "leaving boxes and erecting
structures in public places."83 The evening of the arrest,
Betancourt had chosen to lie down on a park bench and fashion
a tube from three cardboard boxes to cover his body, with the
80 NEW YORK CITY, N.Y. ADMINISTRATIVE CODE § 16-122 (1983).
81 NAACP, 133 F.Supp.2d at 807.
82 Id at 812.
83 NEW YORK CITY, N.Y. ADMINISTRATIVE CODE § 16-122 (1983).
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apparent intent of sheltering himself as he slept. Early the next
morning, police swept through the park, picking up Betancourt
and other homeless individuals and ticketing them under the
aforementioned ordinance. 84
Passed in 1994, this ordinance was a component of the city's
widely publicized "Quality of Life" initiative that cracked down
on street offenses - what critics refer to as "social crimes"85-
such as prostitution, sleeping in public and drug dealing. 86
Betancourt alleged that the ordinance, as applied to him, was
overbroad and unconstitutionally vague, and that his arrest was
without probable cause. He further urged that the ordinance
had little to do with public safety and was rather a thinly veiled
attempt to forcibly remove homeless individuals from the
street.87
To Betancourt's contention of vagueness, the majority con-
cluded that the ordinance was sufficiently clear, stating that
"[a]n ordinary person would understand that an agglomeration
of boxes large enough for a man to fit into would be 'something
that obstructs or impedes.' "88 Secondly, his overbreadth argu-
ment was dismissed on that basis that the doctrine only applied
to activities protected by the First Amendment, and that no such
activity was occurring at his time of arrest. Finally, his arrest
without probable cause was dismissed because he was found in
the box structure, which the Court already identified as clearly
in violation of the ordinance. 89
While the majority rejected Betancourt's vagueness claim,
Circuit Court Judge Calabresi contributed a strongly worded
dissent. Citing the standard established in Kolender v. Lawson
(1983), whereby the statue must provide descriptions of prohib-
84 Betancourt v. Giuliani, 325 F.Supp.2d 330, 331 (S.D.N.Y. 2001).
85 Bancroft, supra note 4, at 64.
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ited actions that an ordinary person would be able to compre-
hend, Judge Calabresi states:
I simply cannot see how one could divine, even af-
ter carefully studying the full text of Section 16-
122(b), that sleeping on a park bench covered with
cardboard is any more unlawful under the ordi-
nance than doing so covered with blankets (which
is plainly not illegal under the law at hand). More-
over, the specific words that the majority empha-
sizes - "to erect" and "obstruction" - do not...
provide meaningful notice to the ordinary citizen
of what is enjoined.90
Judge Calabresi goes on to note that the police department
identifies the statute as an enforcement option for such dispa-
rate crimes as "prostitution, drug sales, and aggressive panhan-
dling," finding that fact alone was sufficient to suggest its intent
to provide unconstitutionally broad discretion to police
officers. 91
Virginia v. Hicks (2003)
The most recent Supreme Court decision regarding municipal
loitering ordinances took place in 2003, when a Virginia man
was arrested for violating an ordinance that prohibited persons
without "a legitimate business or social purpose" 92 from enter-
ing the grounds of public housing facilities maintained by the
Richmond Redevelopment and Housing Authority (RRHA).
The defendant, who claimed he was entering the property to de-
liver diapers to the mother of his child,93 argued that the law was
unconstitutionally overbroad in violation of the First Amend-
90 Id. at 330.
91 Virginia v. Hicks, 539 U.S. 113 (2003).
92 RICHMOND, VA. CODE No. 97-181-197 §1.
93 Bill Mears, Supreme Court will hear anti-loitering case, CNN Law Center.
Jan. 24, 2003, http://www.cnn.com/2003/LAW/01/24/scotus.anti.loitering/ (last
visited Jan. 28, 2015, 5:04p.m.).
Volume 8, Number I Winter 20K4
20
DePaul Journal for Social Justice, Vol. 8, Iss. 1 [2016], Art. 2
https://via.library.depaul.edu/jsj/vol8/iss1/2
PI15LIC SAFE-Y OR SOCIAL EXCLUSION?
ment.94 This argument was based in part on a tacit rule that re-
quired individuals seeking to leaflet or hold a demonstration to
gain permission from facilities managers.9 5
The RRHA purports to have enacted the ordinance in an ef-
fort to curtail on-site drug-related activities. They argued that
the majority of individuals arrested for these offenses were non-
residents, making the ordinance an appropriate means of
achieving their safety objectives. 96 Furthermore, the ordinance
contains a provision whereby trespassers are given written no-
tice that they have been barred from the premises before a for-
mal arrest is made.97 The defendant had been issued such a
notice and subsequently trespassed again, at which point he was
arrested.
While both the Virginia Court of Appeals and Virginia Su-
preme Court found the ordinance unconstitutionally overbroad,
the U.S. Supreme Court unanimously reversed the lower court's
decisions. In a decision penned by Justice Scalia, the court de-
nied the validity of the overbreadth allegation, stating that
"Hicks [had] not shown that the RRHA policy prohibits a sub-
stantial amount of protected speech in relation to its many legit-
imate applications." 91 Justice Scalia went on to note that
overbreadth challenges are generally unsuccessful against regu-
lations that do not specifically address speech or related con-
duct, arguing that the ordinance in question does not inherently
regulate speech because it applies to persons entering the prem-
ises for any purpose. In instances where the ordinance does vio-
late protected expression, the Court felt that as-applied
challenges would provide sufficient legal remedy.99
94 Hicks, 539 U.S. at 113.
95 Id.
96 Mears, supra note 93.
97 RICHMOND, VA. CODE No. 97-181-197 §1.
98 Hicks, 539 U.S. at 123-24.
99 Id.
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CONCLUSION
In recent federal cases, the ability of loitering ordinances to
withstand judicial scrutiny hinged on the specificity with which
they defined offending behaviors. Whereas courts continued to
strike down ordinances that encompassed a broad range of ill-
defined activities,100 those that prohibited particular actions
were largely upheld.'0 Given the judicial doctrines of over-
breadth and void-for-vagueness, it is not surprising that local
legislation has been steered in this direction.
What is less clear is the extent to which this trend represents
progress on the civil rights concerns associated with loitering or-
dinances. On one hand, the statutes that most freely lent them-
selves to arbitrary enforcement against disfavored groups have
been largely invalidated. However, the resulting emphasis on
specific behaviors, such as sleeping in public, occupying a public
sidewalk or visiting a significant other in public housing, could
be seen as contributing to the overt criminalization of activities
associated with individuals in a state of poverty. Those with the
least material wealth are arguably the most dependent on the
use of public spaces, yet increasing prohibition against subsis-
tence activates - some of which are legitimately associated with
dangerous criminal activities, but others merely socially undesir-
able - dramatically constrains their use of this resource.
It may be that the best option for countering the potential
discriminatory impacts of loitering ordinances is to vigilantly
pursue challenges based on the vagueness and overbreadth doc-
trines, narrowing to the greatest extent possible the opportunity
for their discretionary application. The NAACP Anne Arundel
County Branch v. City of Annapolis case cited above illustrates
100 CHICAGO, ILL. MUNICIPAL CODE § 8-4-015(c)(5) (1992); ANNAPOLIS,
MD. MUNICIPAL CODE § 11.12.067 (2004).
101 NEW YORK CITY, N.Y. ADMINISTRATIVE CODE § 16-122 (1983); RICH-
MOND, VA. CODE No. 97-181-197 §1.
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how this approach can be effectively pursued.10 2 Of course, such
challenges will be, at best, piecemeal, leading to victories at the
margins without addressing central issues of disparate policing
practices or the criminalization of activities associated with pov-
erty. As in Chicago following the Morales decision, municipali-
ties may simply revise successfully challenged ordinances to
tailor them to court decisions, reforming the language of the law
without meaningfully addressing the issues associated with their
enforcement.103
Those seeking more substantive opportunities for challenging
systemically discriminatory laws may be heartened by the recent
Floyd et al, v. City of New York (2013) decision, in which the
U.S. District Court of the Southern District of New York found
the City's controversial "stop and frisk" policing tactics had
been carried out in a racially biased manner that violated plain-
tiffs' Fourth and Fourteenth Amendment rights.10 4 Statistical
analyses that demonstrated that African American and Hispanic
individuals were disproportionately likely to be to be targeted
for stops and subject to officers' use of force were among the
central pieces of evidence cited in the decision.,05
However, key facets of the Floyd decision limit its broader
applicability. First, the statistical evidence presented in the case
was based on millions of documented stops. 10 6 In less populous
jurisdictions where sample sizes are necessarily smaller, it would
be substantially more challenging to decisively isolate the im-
pact of race over other confounding factors. Second, in addition
to the statistical evidence, anecdotal evidence suggested that
NYPD officers had been pressured to increase the number of
stops regardless of their legal merit, with indifference to prior
admonitions over the department's racially biased track re-
102 See ANNAPOLIS, MD. MUNICIPAL CODE § 11.12.067 (2004).
103 Packebusch, supra note 51, at 167.
104 Floyd v. City of New York, 959 F. Supp. 2d 540 (S.D.N.Y. 2013).
105 Id. at 558-559.
106 Id. at 558.
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cord. 107 This lent credence to the argument that the department
had proceeded in a deliberately discriminatory manner. In the
absence of comparable evidence, equal protection challenges
may not to meet the intentional discrimination standard.
Ultimately, there is a variety of potential, but limited, legal
remedies that can be pursued against laws that disproportion-
ately burden socially disfavored groups. The most effective chal-
lenges will be dictated by the particular circumstance of the
statute in question. As local governments continue to refine
anti-loitering provisions in an effort to maintain what they view
as effective crime reduction policies, such challenges will con-
tinue to highlight the tension between public safety and social
exclusion.
107 Id. at 560-561.
Volume 8, Number Winter 201+-
24
DePaul Journal for Social Justice, Vol. 8, Iss. 1 [2016], Art. 2
https://via.library.depaul.edu/jsj/vol8/iss1/2
